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Policy recommendations
\ Stimulate the debate on a ‘presumption 
of denial’, ‘White List’ and justification 
mechanism
Arms exports to non-EU countries should not be 
permitted on principle. An exemption to this exclusion 
would have to be specifically justified. Therefore, 
member states should agree on a ‘White List’ of recipi-
ent countries for European arms, which are assessed 
unanimously as acceptable. If member states never-
theless grant licences to non-EU countries that are not 
listed on the White List, they would be obliged to justi-
fy these decisions on COARM or Council level. To stim-
ulate the debate on these instruments, the European 
parliament itself should work on a ‘White List’ and as-
sess the member states’ export practices against this 
background.
\ Establish a subcommittee on arms 
export controls
The European parliament should create a subcommit-
tee on arms export controls to discuss improvements
of EU arms export controls and to act as a supervisory 
body. The subcommittee would publish an annual re-
port assessing member states’ export practices. An ad-
visory body that ensures exchange between members 
of the European parliament, national parliamentarians 
and societal actors should assist this subcommittee.
\ The European parliament should take 
the initiative and develop a concept of 
restrictive EU arms export controls
The Council of the European Union and the mem-
ber states have failed to counter the substantial 
weaknesses of EU arms export controls. It is now the 
European parliament’s turn to take the debate forward 
by developing its own concept of restrictive EU arms 
export controls.
\ No competence for arms export 
controls for the Commission
A communitisation of arms export controls under the 
authority of the European Commission is unrealistic 
and undesirable. While it would offer the possibility of 
formal sanctions, it might lead to an even less restric-
tive control system than the existing one. Instead, the 
European parliament should build on the regulatory 
potential of social sanctions and naming and sham-
ing-effects within the current division of 
competencies.
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The current system of arms export controls in the  
European Union (EU) is characterised by a tension 
between liberalisation and fragmentation of control. 
On the one hand, the Europeanisation of the arms in-
dustry is pushed ahead by liberalising arms transfers 
within the European Union and promoting coopera-
tion. One example in this regard is the European  
Defence Action Plan, which aims to strengthen the 
European defence industry. On the other hand, EU 
governments have failed to set up an effective system 
of restrictive arms export controls on the EU level. EU 
member states have agreed on a legally binding Com-
mon Position governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment. This Common Position 
sets out eight criteria for the assessment of arms  
export licences by member states including, for  
example, criterion two 'Respect for human rights and 
international humanitarian law' by the recipient 
country or criterion three 'Internal situation in the 
recipient country'. Yet, the actual implementation of 
export controls takes place at the national level. This 
leads to an incoherent and contradictory application 
of the eight criteria, which cannot be sanctioned by 
the European Union. Recently, the most striking 
example of such incoherent and inconsistent imple-
mentation are arms exports from EU countries to the 
Saudi-led Yemen war coalition. While the European 
parliament believes that arms exports to countries of 
the war coalition violate at least criterion two of the 
Common Position, and multiple EU countries have 
imposed arms export restrictions on parts of the war 
coalition, other member states, such as France and 
Spain, continue to supply arms to those states, in par-
ticular to Saudi Arabia. 
Against this background, the European parliament 
called for a change in EU arms export controls. In its 
Resolution on arms export and the implementation 
of the Common Position (2018), it criticises the mem-
ber states’ systematic failure to apply the eight crite-
ria and takes the view that greater convergence in 
their application should be promoted. The review of 
the Common Position that began in 2015 would have 
provided a good opportunity for the member states to 
respond to these weaknesses of the system and to 
take concrete steps towards a restrictive EU arms  
export controls. But the recent Council’s decision 
amending the Common Position remains highly un-
satisfactory. The introduction of a reporting deadline 
and the provision of the EU annual report as a narra-
tive report and searchable online database are exam-
ples of the few notable developments member states 
agreed on. However, criteria were neither tightened 
nor were institutional arrangements to promote the 
coherent application of existing criteria proposed. 
The Council and member states are thus not counter-
ing the substantial weaknesses of EU arms export 
controls. On the contrary, diverging export practices 
are mainly interpreted as obstacles to cooperation 
projects and, as the recent French–German agreement 
shows, national governments misrepresent harmoni-
sation as an adaptation and concession to less restric-
tive export practices of other member states.
By undermining their own rules and not applying 
them coherently, member states gamble with the 
credibility of the European Union, which advocates 
human rights and a rule-based international order. 
But the Council and the member states will not re-
view the Common Position for another five years. 
Therefore, it is the European parliament’s turn to 
stand up for its expressed critique in its resolution 
(2018) and to take the debate forward. Until the next 
review, the European parliament must develop a con-
cept of a restrictive EU arms export control system. 
This concept must include tightened criteria as well 
as procedures that promote compliance, coherent  
application of existing rules and democratic scrutiny. 
In addition to already existing proposals on how to 
tighten the European criteria, the following recom-
mendations shall stimulate this debate by discussing 
the question of competencies within the EU-multi- 
level system, presenting mechanisms that could  
promote the coherent application of existing criteria 
and by exploring the European parliament’s scope of 
action. 
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A communitisation of arms exports 
controls?
At first sight, the highest degree of coherence in EU 
arms export controls could be assured if the compe-
tence for arms export controls were in one and not  
28 (or 27) ‘hands’. Competence could, therefore, be 
shifted from the national to the supranational level. 
The most radical step in this regard would be to dis-
solve Article 346 (1)(b) TFEU, which grants member 
states extensive rights to act independently in the 
field of arms production and trade. Such a step could 
transform the Common Position into an EU regula-
tion or directive and fully integrate arms export con-
trols into the competence of the Commission. This 
would, for example, open up the possibility of the 
Commission establishing an own European licensing 
authority and Directorate-General on Arms Export 
Controls. Another possibility would be that the Com-
mission transfers this task to the national licensing 
authorities of the member states but sanctions viola-
tions of EU law, for example, by initiating infringe-
ment proceedings. Consequences of such a procedure 
could range from a letter of formal notice to referring 
the matter to the Court of Justice, potentially resulting 
in financial penalties. Hence, the centralisation of 
competence and the related, so far non-existent, formal 
possibility of sanctions could enhance compliance 
and coherence of EU arms export controls. However, 
there are several concerns about this option. First, it 
is highly unlikely that member states will agree to 
transfer their competencies for arms production and 
trade to the Commission. Second, and even more sig-
nificant, without a substantial change of the political 
priorities of the Commission, such centralisation 
would not be desirable from a restrictive arms export 
controls perspective. The Commission looks at the 
European arms industry and arms export policy  
primarily from a competitive perspective, as became 
clear in the discussions on the European Defence 
Fund (EDF) and the establishment of the new Direc-
torate-General for Defence Industry and Space. It 
does not seem likely that the Commission would be 
willing to place arms export restrictions or sanction 
licencing decisions of the member states to the detri-
ment of the competitiveness of the European arms 
industry on the global market. Hence, the transfer of 
competence to the Commission might lead to an 
even less restrictive system than the current one.  
Additionally, due to the complexity of the EU-system, 
it would be more difficult for the public to identify 
direct political responsibility for decisions on arms 
exports than on the national level. This would hamper 
democratic scrutiny. 
Another option to promote compliance and coher-
ence in arms export controls within the European 
Union could be shifting competencies for arms export 
controls to the Commission and transferring the 
Common Position into an EU directive—but main-
taining Article 346 (1)(b) TFEU. This option might be 
politically more realistic but also not sufficiently  
convincing. It would offer the possibility of a formal 
sanction for suspected non- compliance with European 
criteria by the Commission launching an infringement 
procedure. This could enhance compliance and co-
herence of existing rules but goes along with the con-
cerns already mentioned. On top, recourse to Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU would constitute a valid justification 
for the infringement of EU law as the article states 
that “any member state may take such measures as it 
considers necessary for the protection of the essential 
interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material”. Although the states would have to make it 
plausible that the application of Article 346 (1)(b) 
TFEU is based on an essential security interest and 
not on economic interest, the Commission or the 
Court of Justice will hardly second guess a member 
states’ political assessment of its essential national 
security interests. Accordingly, a review of arms export 
decisions would probably be limited to a plausibility 
check.
In sum, at first sight, a communitisation might im-
prove the coherence of European arms export licens-
ing, but even if this could be realised, it would probably 
come at the cost of a less restrictive system than the 
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This logic can be implemented in EU arms export 
controls by starting from a presumption of denial for 
arms exports to non-EU countries. On principle, arms 
exports to countries outside the European Union 
should not be permitted. An exemption to this exclu-
sion would have to be specifically justified. To reinforce 
this recommendation vis-à-vis the Council and the 
member states, the European parliament itself should 
asses the member states’ export practices against the 
background of this presumption. Due to Article 346 (1)
(b) TFEU, the presumption of denial would leave room 
for exemptions. To manage the process of granting 
exemptions in the sense of restrictive controls, the 
following mechanisms would be helpful instruments: 
1\ Creation of a so-called White List to ensure co-
herent compliance with the European criteria in 
the case of exemptions. The main arms exporting 
countries within the European Union are already 
familiar with such an instrument through Article 
13 of the Framework Agreement concerning 
Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and  
Operation of the European Defence Industry. The 
White List should include non-EU countries that 
nevertheless qualify as recipient countries be-
cause they satisfy the criteria of the Common  
Position. Proposals for countries to be put on the 
White List ought to be prepared by the existing 
Working Party on Conventional Arms Export 
(COARM). In the next step, each proposed country 
would have to be adopted unanimously by the 
Council. It should also be possible to update the 
White List annually to make decisions on the in-
clusion or removal of non-EU countries from the 
list. The use of this instrument does not mean 
that arms exports to countries on the White List 
must be granted automatically. It is rather an  
instrument that enhances coherent compliance 
with an agreed standard that the member states 
can apply more restrictively. This corresponds 
with the Common Position’s aim to set high 
common standards which shall be regarded as 
the minimum by all member states.
current one and an even weaker political accounta-
bility. This begs the question, how compliance and 
coherence can be improved in the current system, 
that is within the framework of Article 346 (1)(b) TFEU 
and the Common Position that falls within the com-
petence of the Council and the member states. In 
light of the poor performance of the Council in  
reviewing the Common Position, it is now up to the 
European parliament to advance the conceptualis-
ation of restrictive EU arms export controls. As the 
current system does not offer a formal sanction 
mechanism, parliament should look at the regulatory 
potential of social sanctions to achieve greater com-
pliance and coherence with existing rules and to pro-
mote democratic scrutiny. This can be achieved by 
mechanisms that enhance ‘naming and shaming’- 
effects towards the member states by enhanced infor-
mation exchange and requirements to justify arms 
export decisions. 
Promoting compliance, coherence and 
democratic scrutiny in EU arms export 
controls
Despite the European parliament’s political demand  
to promote compliance with and the coherent applica-
tion of existing rules, suggestions on how this can be 
achieved and institutionalised within the EU’s multi- 
level system are still underdeveloped. Therefore, the 
European parliament should confront the Council and 
the member states with concrete proposals. To draw 
the Council’s and the member states’ attention to these 
proposals, the European parliament should model the 
behaviour that it expects from the Council and the 
member states to take themselves. 
Presumption of denial, ‘White List’ and justification 
mechanism
Weapons are no ordinary economic goods but means 
of violence. Hence, arms exports must be judged ac-
cording to the same ethical criteria as the threat or 
use of force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that 
all members shall refrain from the use of force. Deci-
sions on the use of force and thus on arms exports 
must, therefore, be explicitly justified by those in favour. 
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2\ Establishment of a ‘justification mechanism’.  
Due to Article 346 (1)(b) TFEU, member states would 
retain the right to grant licences for arms exports 
to countries outside the White List. Although the 
final decision lies in the member states’ hands, 
they would have to justify such a decision at the 
EU level. This justification mechanism is intend-
ed to increase pressure on and among EU mem-
ber states to comply with their own criteria. This 
can be achieved by extending the already exist-
ing information exchange between member  
states. Each one of the member states should be 
obliged to justify positive arms export decisions 
to countries not listed on the White List by ex-
plaining their decision in light of each criterion 
of the Common Position. Once this explanation 
has been shared with all member states via the 
existing online system, it should be presented by 
the member state’s representative at a regular 
COARM meeting. To further increase the pressure 
on member states, the next step could be to dis-
cuss the case at Council level. Such an approach 
would follow the logic of Article 9 of the Common 
Position which states that “Member States shall, 
as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP 
framework the situation of potential or actual  
recipients of exports of military technology and 
equipment”. Possibilities to identify cases that 
ought to be discussed at Council level are the fol-
lowing: Either a member state calls for a discus-
sion of the case at Council level, or it is a case in 
which the existing denial notification mecha-
nism shows that another member state has al-
ready rejected a similar export to a non-White 
List country. 
To stimulate the debate on such an approach, the  
European parliament itself should draw up such a 
White List and assess member states’ export practices 
against this background. 
Promoting democratic scrutiny
All the mechanisms presented so far aim to support 
coherent compliance with the European criteria by 
promoting a common interpretation of these criteria 
and exerting pressure on member states to comply 
with them. But it is not enough that the member 
states have to justify their decisions among them-
selves. Their decisions must also be subject to demo-
cratic scrutiny at the European level. 
Democratic scrutiny is characterised by transparency 
and parliamentarisation. Transparency is the most 
important prerequisite for the public as well as par-
liamentarians to exert control over member states’ 
decisions. Under the current system, the Council in-
forms on member states’ arms exports by publishing 
an annual report. However, this report needs to be  
improved in several ways. In light of the proposals 
presented, the most striking improvements of the  
EU annual report would be the following: The report 
should include case studies that show how govern-
ments have assessed export decisions against the  
criteria. The United Kingdom, for example, already  
included such case studies in its national report. The 
report should also make clear the scope of arms  
exports to non-White List countries.  The number of 
cases discussed under the justification mechanism  
at COARM or Council level must be outlined per 
country, including the number of cases where mem-
ber states have decided to export despite the discus-
sion. These adaptions would further a genuine public 
political debate on arms exports controls and could 
enhance a coherent interpretation of the criteria 
through public pressure. In this sense, and similar to 
the White List discussed above, the European parlia-
ment should seize the initiative and present a blue-
print for the EU annual report containing all the in-
formation parliamentarians need to exert control.
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In addition to strengthening transparency, parlia-
mentarisation must also be promoted. The European 
parliament can exert its control function within the 
framework of EU arms export controls primarily by 
assessing the member states’ compliance with the 
European criteria. Based on this assessment, the  
European parliament can then put pressure on the 
member states by publicly criticising their export 
practices where necessary. To institutionalise this 
function, parliament could establish a subcommittee 
on arms export controls located under the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. The main task of this subcommittee 
would be to act as a supervisory body, evaluating 
member states’ export practices against the criteria 
of the Common Position and publishing its assess-
ments in a public report. The subcommittee would 
also be in charge to work on concrete proposals of 
how to improve EU arms export controls. 
It would be necessary to implement a regular exchange 
between such a subcommittee and COARM so that 
the subcommittee can fulfil its function as a supervi-
sory body. One option would be that the proposed 
justifications for arms exports to non-White List 
countries to be discussed at Council level are shared 
with the subcommittee. The subcommittee can agree 
on a statement which will then be shared with all 
member states via the online system. In this context, 
it is important to note that the subcommittee should 
not be too restricted by confidentiality obligations. 
Hence, some of the subcommittee’s statements 
should be published in its annual report—in addition 
to the general assessment of member states’ arms  
export practices and suggestions for improvement 
within the EU arms export control system. In contrast 
to the already existing resolutions of the European 
parliament, this report should be out of quota of the 
limited number of own-initiative reports that each 
parliamentary committee can submit per legislature. 
Such a report ought to be compiled on an annual 
basis. This could provide an incentive for the member 
states to comply with the existing criteria and not to 
be shamed in the report. To strengthen this possible 
effect, member states should be required to agree 
within COARM on a response to the subcommittee’s 
report.
Given that, under the current system, political  
accountability is highest at the national level, the 
connection between the European parliament and 
national parliaments should be strengthened. Further-
more, in terms of democratic control, it seems con-
structive to include exchanges with different societal 
stakeholders. One way of putting this into practice is 
to establish a forum to promote exchange between 
members of the European parliament, national par-
liamentarians and societal actors. The already exist-
ing Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons could give an insight into how such a forum 
could be structured. The forum should act as an advi-
sory body to the proposed subcommittee. The expertise 
of national parliamentarians and civil society actors 
could help to prepare the subcommittee’s public re-
port on the implementation of the Common Position 
and to develop further suggestions for improving 
arms export controls in the European Union.
Conclusion
The Council and the member states seem to have no 
common vision for developing a restrictive EU arms 
export control system. Likewise, the Commission  
focusses mainly on competition and industrial policy. 
The result of the recent Common Position’s review is 
far from tackling the substantive weaknesses of the 
current practice. Therefore, it is the parliamentarians’ 
turn to intensify their engagement on the design of a 
restrictive EU arms export control system, which  
promotes compliance, coherence and democratic  
scrutiny. The European parliament should remember 
its own criticism and not allow itself to be sidelined. 
It should actively shape the debate and increase its 
scope of action. Parliamentarians can work on con-
crete proposals and confront the Council and the 
TAKING THE INITIATIVE: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EU ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS    \ CHARLOTTE KEHNE
7 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 10 \ 2019
member states with their suggestions, for example 
via resolutions and during the biannual discussion 
with the High Representative. At the same time, the 
European parliament should enforce its proposals by 
modelling the behaviour that it expects from the 
member states and the Council to take themselves.
Accordingly, parliamentarians could 
   \ establish a new parliamentarian subcommittee 
on arms export controls to institutionalise its 
function as a supervisory body;
   \ let its assessment of the Common Position’s 
implementation be guided by a presumption 
of denial;
   \ draw up a White List and assess the member 
states’ export practices against this 
background; 
   \ present a blueprint for the EU annual report. 
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